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BOOK REVIEW 
LIFE, DEATH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Larry L Palmerf" 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, EcoNOM-
Ics, AND PUBuc PouCY. By Neil K. Komesar.t Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 1994. 287 pp. $34.95. 
In the public's mind, "legal scholarship," like "legal advice," is 
perhaps an oxymoron. In the latter, the listener often hears predic-
tions about the possible outcomes of an arcane adjudicative process 
far removed from the personal decisions that led to the need for pro-
fessional advice. In the former, most legal scholars assume prominent 
roles for judges and adjudicative processes. In reality, the courts are, 
at best, distant influences on the lives of most individuals. Legal schol-
ars quickly embrace the mantle of interdisciplinary (or more accu-
rately, multidisciplinary) approaches when discussing particular 
public policy issues. Nonetheless, most interdisciplinary legal scholars 
start with adjudicative processes (after all, that is what we teach in law 
schools) as the core of their analyses. As a result, scholars assume that 
courts are the central decision makers in diverse public policy de-
bates, such as how new reproductive technology should be used, 1 or 
whether medical technology should be used to end the lives of certain 
patients.2 
Komesar offers a conceptual framework for resolving public pol-
icy dilemmas-"comparative institutional analysis."3 Forget simplistic 
notions of public policy making that assume political processes are 
always better than acljudicative processes in resolving policy dilemmas. 
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. AB. Harvard University; LL.B. Yale Univer-
sity. I acknowledge the assistance of Roberta Armstrong, Davydd Greenwood, and Suzy 
Szasz, all of whom were kind enough to read and comment on earlier drafts of this piece. I 
wish to thank Marcie A Finlay, a second year student at the Cornell Law School, for her 
able assistance on the foomotes. 
:t: Komesar is the James E. and Ruth B. Doyle-Bascom Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, Madison. 
1 See generally JoHN A RoBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw RE. 
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) (citing codes and statutes throughout the book). 
2 See RoNALD DwoRKIN, LIFE's DoMINION: AN ABGUMENT ABOUT ABoRTION, EUTHANA· 
SIA, AND INDMDUAL FREEDOM 179-217 (1993). 
3 NEIL K. KoMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHoosiNG INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, Eco. 
NOMICS, AND PUBUC Poucv 3-13 (1994). 
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Do not expect to find that market forces are always superior simply 
because Komesar is trained as both an economist and a lawyer. 
Rather, Komesar proposes that deciding whether the market, the 
political process, or the adjudicative process should resolve a question 
is the very essence of public policy making. His conceptual framework 
assumes that the choice is often opting for the least harmful institu-
tion, rather than aspiring for the best process to address the ques-
tion.4 As a result, Neil Komesar's book is refreshingly different from 
most legal scholarship. 
I suggest that Komesar's framework is especially important to 
those who see legal scholarship at its best as informed by the tensions 
between the practical and the theoretical. When we speak about is-
sues of public policy, we must remember we are simply citizen-schol-
ars, not experts or high priests of law, economics, philosophy, 
medicine, or science.5 Komesar's work reminds us that the views of 
those who type our manuscripts or check out our groceries, as well as 
those who sit in offices in federal court houses, are participants in the 
formulation of public policy. 
In Part I, I will summarize Komesar's mandate for institutional 
analysis with a discussion of his views on market forces, legislation, 
and the court system. Part II applies Komesar's framework to the 
problem of physician-assisted suicide. Part III applies Komesar's prin-
ciples to in vitro fertilization decisions. With these examples, I con-
clude that Komesar has provided scholars and institutional players 
with a profound method for approaching such difficult questions of 
public policy. 
I 
ScHoLARS, Pusuc Poucv, AND CoNSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: KoMESAR's FRAMEWORK 
Komesar sttuctures his book in a manner that helps the reader 
understand his conceptualization of the scholarship on public policy 
and law. Proposition One, for instance, which is argued throughout 
the book, states "[t]he choice of social goals or values is insufficient to 
4 A trio of scholars working in the area of family law have proposed that the legisla-
tive goal should be "the least detrimental alternative." JosEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53 (1979). While this approach was developed in a field 
seemingly far removed from the ml!ior focus ofKomesar's book, it is generally applicable. 
I will demonstrate how the Komesar framework can be used to frame the question for 
reproductive technology. See infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text. 
5 See generally Larry I. Palmer, The High Priests Questioned or at Least Cross-Examined, 5 
RVT.-CAM. LJ. 237 (1974) (commenting on jAY KATZ ET AL., EXPERIMENTATION WITH 
HUMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE lNvEsTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS, AND STATE IN 
THE HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS (1972));Joseph Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and juris-
prudence, 77 YALE LJ. 1053, 1060 (1968) (emphasizing the limited contribution psychoanal-
ysis can make to jurisprudence). 
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tell us anything about law and public policy either descriptively or pre-
scriptively. One must seriously consider institutional choice in order 
to understand or reform law and public policy."6 Proposition Two 
urges that institutional analysis should be a methodology of compar-
ing alternative institutions, not simply a critique of the imperfections 
of courts, the markets, or the political processes. 7 And finally, Propo-
sition Three urges that institutional analysis "should be participation-
centered,"8 a modification of the interest group theory of politics 
widely embraced in many disciplines, including constitutional theory.9 
These themes are pervasive throughout the text. 
In his second chapter, Komesar introduces the reader to the most 
persistent problem in public policy analysis: the confusion of social 
goals such as efficiency of resource allocation or protection of "funda-
mental rights" with public policy analysis.10 There is abundant dis-
course in modem legal scholarship about "rights" as the central idea 
of legal theory,11 but as Komesar points out, "[c]alling something a 
'right' is an institutional statement."12 
For Komesar, the essence of public policy analysis is "institutional 
choice": deciding which of several institutional processes within law-
adjudicative, administrative, or legislative-should be given the au-
thority to decide a particular issue. But "the market," namely the real-
ity of what people do, is also an institutional process to be considered 
within any analysis of public policy. Thus, considering the limitations 
of law in any of its forms to change particular kinds of human behav-
ior is an aspect of comparative institutional analysis. 
The work of Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase pro-
vides the conceptual foundation for Komesar's book. Komesar argues, 
however, that most economic analyses of law have misinterpreted the 
meaning of the famous Coase Theorem-that it does not matter 
which rule of property rights is chosen by law in terms of efficient 
allocation of resources, if one assumes no transaction costs.13 Ironi-
cally, in Komesar's view, for a world with imperfect institutions, 
6 KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 271. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 272. 
9 Komesar cites a number of leading constitutional scholars who rely upon interest-
group analysis, e.g., Epstein and Cherminsky. Id. at 216 n.38. 
10 Id. at 14-50. 
11 Komesar centers his attack on the Rawlsian conception of justice that secures basic 
liberties for each person and provides for social and economic equality. For a complete 
treatment of this theory, see JoHN RAwr.s, A THEORY oF JusrJcE (1971). 
12 KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 43. 
13 Id. at 29. Komesar makes the point about property rule, but I believe the implica-
tions of the Coase Theorem apply to liability rules as well. See LARRY I. PALMER, LAw, 
MEDICINE, AND SoCIAL JUSTICE 14-15 (1989). Komesar develops this linkage to Coase, ini-
tially discussed in Part I of the book, in later portions of his text. See KoMESAR, supra note 3, 
at 61-62, 109-12. 
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Coase's work, when properly understood, makes the institutional ar-
rangements within law very important for public policy. 
Komesar thus criticizes the scholarship of law-and-economics 
types, public choice theorists, philosophers, and constitutional theo-
rists for either assuming that institutional arrangements in a society 
are irrelevant, or for confining their analyses to only one institution.l4 
He demonstrates convincingly that comparative institutional analysis 
is a powerful tool for understanding a wide range of public policy is-
sues-pollution, tort reform, and First Amendment jurisprudence. 
His methodology is a participant-centered approach to the political 
process, the market, and the courts. Komesar begins his participant-
centered analysis with the political process, that messy and supposedly 
irrational process that annoys many legal policy scholars.15 He de-
scribes the economic based "interest group theory of politics" 
("IGTP") and IGTP's critics. The latter view the assumption that pub-
lic officials are motivated solely by narrow self-interest as simply a vari-
ation on "the proverbial economic person,"16 where the incentives are 
campaign contributions and maintaining oneself in office. 
Komesar details the shortcomings of both IGTP scholars and crit-
ics and proposes a two-force model of IGTP. He recognizes that spe-
cial interest groups with high stakes in a particular outcome are 
participants in legislative decisions, but so are indifferent voters, legis-
lators, their staff members, and committees.17 He uses Coase's work 
to demonstrate that these institutional actors have various degrees of 
access to information that could lead to either majoritarian or mi-
noritarian biases in legislation.18 To explain this aspect of the real 
world, Komesar proposes that we analyze legislation with regard to 
particular issues-in other words, treat the political process as an insti-
tutional process.19 
In his detailed arguments, Komesar urges courts, particularly the 
United States Supreme Court, to engage in careful analysis of 
problems legislatures have addressed before declaring themselves to 
be the appropriate institutions to correct minoritarian bias in political 
and market processes.20 An economic analysis of law is important, not 
14 At one level, the list of scholars appears to be a "Who's Who" of modem legal and 
public policy scholarship-John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Posner, John Ely, Guido 
Calabresi, and James Buchanan. In addition to the usual index, there is a very helpful 
author index in the book. KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 277-79. Komesar focuses his critical 
analysis on the most prominent authors listed above. 
15 ld. at 53-97. 
16 Id. at 53. 
17 Id. at 65-75. 
18 ld. at 61-62. 
19 Id. at 53-97. 
20 When a court is asked to consider, for instance, if legislation that purports to pro-
tect the public from "false" or "misleading" advertising by pharmacies is constitutional, it is 
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for the purpose of ignoring the political or adjudicative processes, but 
for the purpose of choosing market processes when they are the least 
harmful alternative.2I 
But when Komesar turns his analysis to courts, the darlings of 
legal scholars, it is apparent that comparative institutional analysis 
yields some surprising results. While he agrees that judges in this 
country have more independence than legislators, he points out that 
there is a cost: judges have less direct information from the numerous 
participants about great social concerns.22 Furthermore, he points 
out that the high barriers to entry into the court system, including 
jurisdictional requirements and the expense of litigation, make courts 
less certain about the effects of their decisions on the masses. 23 More-
over, even if claimants succeed in having their day in court, there is a 
"skewed distribution of stakes," particularly in class actions, where ma-
jority interests are often undercompensated.24 There is no single lit-
mus test of the soundness of legislation that courts can use, according 
to Komesar, because judges and juries are "aloof."25 According to 
Komesar, this aloofness is the product of a judicial system which iso-
lates the judge and jury from public opinion and elections, and which 
provides information through the distorting lens of the adversary 
system.26 
Komesar suggests that courts may be performing the correct insti-
tutional role in declaring unconstitutional recent tort reform legisla-
tion such as damage caps on awards in malpractice cases.27 If the 
public policy issue is conceived of as promoting the optimal or appro-
priate level of health and safety, much of the current tort reform 
movement is a case of severe political malfunction.28 In other words, 
a court can rightly decide that it has the institutional capacity to de-
clare that individual adjudication of claims after the fact is the appro-
priate public policy, particularly when the costs of prevention cannot 
appropriate for courts to recoguize that this particular attempt at regulation of the market 
for goods and seiVices imposes numerous transaction costs on consumers. This protection 
of "commercial speeCh," for Komesar, is best understood as an instance where courts are 
the corrective for the political process' restrictions on the information flow in this particu-
lar market for goods and seiVices. ld. at 120 & n.30. 
21 Id. at 98-122. 
22 ld. at 123. 
23 Id. at 125-28. 
24 ld. at 130-34. 
25 Id. at 141. 
26 Id. at 141. 
27 Id. at 193-95. While Komesar specifically states he does not decide this issue, id. at 
195, his discussion of how judges can serve to correct political malfunction leads one to 
believe he implies that the courts' role is proper. 
28 Id. at 193-94. 
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be distributed in a fair and efficient manner through a combination 
of market and political processes.29 
Komesar further sees the drafting of constitutions as a problem of 
choosing the deeper institutional design of a given society.30 He criti-
cizes many current theorists, including John Ely,31 for ignoring the 
complexity of the political process as an institutional process. For 
Komesar, the corrective for a political malfunction-or any other in-
stitutional malfunction-is not simply a matter of whether one trusts 
or distrusts the current, past, or future political process: "In the com-
plex world of institutional choice, foxes might be assigned to guard 
the chicken coop where the alternatives (bears, weasels, and so forth) 
are worse."32 
Komesar's critique of the scholarship on the appropriate role of 
judicial review of legislation is deft. He points out that the expansive 
notion of the role of the judiciary in protecting property rights under 
a new substantive economic due process theory is an institutional illu-
sion.33 He takes both the fundamental rights theorists and their op-
ponents (the proponents of strict adherence to the original intent of 
the framers) to task for their non-institutional view of constitutional 
adjudication.34 Through this analysis, he places Ronald Dworkin, a 
"fundamental rights" scholar,35 and Supreme CourtJustice Scalia, an 
"original intent" theorist,36 in the same non-institutional camp.37 
Komesar argues against any such overarching theory of judicial re-
view, since the role of the judiciary is determined after a comparative 
institutional analysis, not before such analysis is undertaken. 38 
29 I was particularly impressed with how Komesar takes on the media and political 
perception that there is "too much" litigation and carefully analyzes the claims of various 
participants and the available data. Id. at 153-95. 
30 Id. at 196-231. 
31 Id. at 204-05. 
32 Id. at 204. 
33 Id. at 233-50. Komesar critiques Richard Epstein's neo-Lockean libertarian views as 
expressed in his book, RICHARD A EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERlY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 238-56. 
34 Constitutional theorists who use public choice theories to describe the process of 
the making of our own constitution come into Komesar's critique for assuming that the 
making of the Constitution was simply a way to overcome special interest groups in the 
legislative process. These theorists ignore the possibility of majoritarian bias in the polit-
ical process. KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 216-21. 
35 Id. at 261 n.40. See generally RoNALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) 
(applying Dworkin's theory of rights to judicial decision-making). 
36 KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 265 n.46. 
37 Id. at 256 ("Each of these approaches seems to offer a way to shon-circuit all the 
messiness and ambiguity of institutional choice."); see also id. at 255-65 (discussion of the 
two non-institutional approaches). 
38 Id. at 270. 
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CREATING ONE's OWN DEATH: KoMESAR's INSTITUTIONAL 
APPROACH v. DwoRKIN's FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
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Komesar is critiquing and attempting to change non-institutional 
analyses of public policy, and he suggests that the reader do the same. 
I accept this invitation by examining the approach taken to physician-
assisted suicide. I will analyze the issue using the process suggested by 
Komesar-one which requires a great deal more than an analysis of 
the Court's opinions. 
Ronald Dworkin's recent book, Life's Dominion: An Argument About 
Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom, 39 presents several analyses 
of the acljudicative principles of courts. Dworkin poses the question, 
"Do Americans have a constitutional right to die?"40 and answers it in 
the affirmative. Dworkin's non-institutional analysis of public policy is 
exactly what Komesar wants us to question. My own institutional anal-
ysis leads me to ask an alternative question: Is the United States 
Supreme Court, rather than the market or political processes, the ap-
propriate institution for handling the range of issues surrounding the 
termination of medical care? 
If we think about the market process and the political process 
surrounding terminating care, Dworkin's analysis is defective. His fail-
ure is manifest by the way he discusses the public referendum in 
Washington and California in 1991 and 1992 over physician-assisted 
suicide.41 Dworkin argues that in both situations, a small min·ority, an 
interest group with what Komesar would call "minoritarian bias" or 
high stakes42 in the outcome, overwhelmed the apparent will of an 
otherwise indifferent or uninformed m~ority.43 Dworkin's concern 
about the supposed misuse of the political process by special interest 
groups, such as the Catholic church, is an argument that the political 
process has malfunctioned in terms of failing to act in accordance 
with the polity's deepest principles.44 
39 DwoRKIN, supra note 2. 
40 Id. at 181. 
41 Id. at 179-217. 
42 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text; KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 54-58. 
43 Dworkin notes at the beginning of his book: 
In 1991, the voters of Washington State narrowly defeated a referendum 
bill that would have legalized euthanasia there, and in 1992 similar legisla-
tion was defeated in California. In both cases it was expected, well before 
the election, that the bill would pass, but groups opposing euthanasia, in-
cluding the Catholic church, waged bitter and effective campaigns, spend-
ing far more than the groups supporting it. 
DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 4. Komesar does not deal explicitly with the institution of 
medicine directly in his book. I believe, however, that the institutional analysis is implicit 
in his discussion of malpractice. See KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 158-61. 
44 In the literature on law and economics this is often referred to as "rent-seeking." 
See KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 55 n.3. 
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Dworkin deals with the Catholic church and other interest groups 
by creating the "rational person" whose principles about abortion and 
euthanasia can be connected to what Dworkin sees as the public pol-
icy issue. He concludes that: "[s]ome of the political groups that op-
posed the euthanasia initiatives in Washington and California sensed 
a connection between permissiveness about euthanasia and a liberal 
attitude toward abortion."45 Any reading of a current newspaper will 
indicate that the political rhetoric of our day combines issues in this 
way, but Dworkin does not explain why a body engaging in serious 
public policy making, such as the United States Supreme Court, 
should see the two issues as connected. 
To make his argument in favor of a constitutional right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide, Dworkin provides a non-institutional interpreta-
tion of the m::gor United States Supreme Court case on terminating 
care. In Cruzan v. Directar, Missouri Department of Health,46 the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Missouri statutory scheme for re-
moving food and nutrients from an unconscious patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state. For Dworkin, the important part about Cruzan 
was that the "Court seemed to recognize, at least in principle, that 
states must honor living wills."47 For Dworkin, this created the neces-
sary connection to the value of "autonomy" and the Court's decisions 
on abortion. For an institutionalist, however, Cruzan contains three 
different institutional questions posed by the three opinions of the 
Justices in the m::gority. 
Justice Rehnquist, whose position Dworkin criticizes as "conserva-
tive,"48 is explicit in Cruzan about what the question involved: 
"Whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution 
which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
under these circumstances."49 He specifically stated that the attempt 
by Cruzan's guardians to state the question in terms of her alleged 
constitutional right of privacy or autonomy was inappropriate: "The 
difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it begs the question: 
An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and volun-
tary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any 
other right."50 
Justice Scalia, whose opinion Dworkin also criticizes, 51 asked a dif-
ferent question: Whether the Constitution forbids a state from adopt-
ing legislation that seeks to prevent an individual from killing him or 
45 DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 194. 
46 497 u.s. 261, 281 (1990). 
47 DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 181. 
48 Id. at 214. 
49 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. 
50 Id. at 280. 
51 DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 194-95, 198. 
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herself. 52 His question, and thus his opinion, that the statutory 
scheme was constitutional, is a declaration of the Court's institutional 
incompetence to deal with the so-called "right to die" issue.5 3 
Justice O'Connor, ignored by Dworkin, wrote a separate opinion 
"to emphasize that the Court does not today decide the issue whether 
a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decision 
maker."54 Although she is not nearly as explicit as Rehnquist as to the 
precise question for her in the case, one might wonder if her concur-
rence indicates a difficulty with Rehnquist's formulation of the ques-
tion or his particular answer to the question. 
It would be heresy for Dworkin or his followers to suggest that 
Justice Rehnquist in Cruzan addresses an institutional question involv-
ing a decision about how the Court should use its resources. Despite 
the similarity in values at stake in abortion and terminating care, ana-
lyzing the problems institutionally might lead the Court to treat these 
two public policy problems distinctly. The Court might treat the two 
issues differently because the various Justices might see dissimilar insti-
tutional choices presented. 
Physician-assisted suicide would come to the Court in the context 
of its prior decision in Cruzan. A piece of legislation like the one at 
issue in Cruzan would be viewed as an attempt to regulate an impor-
tant social institution, medicine, along with the many actors in that 
process. The Court might view the political process and the mark~t 
process as adequate to protect physicians from the legal risks stem-
ming from difficult ethical questions. These processes could help dis-
criminate the circumstances under which a doctor could terminate a 
patient's care or could take active steps to end a "patient's" life from 
those under which a doctor could not do so.55 On the other hand, 
legislation aimed at abortion control seeks to regulate the formation 
52 Although his opinion in Cruzan makes many references to his view that the lack of 
mention of a right to suicide in the text of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution decided for him the issue presented, his question, along 
with his underlying judicial philosophy, allows him to suggest that he and his eight col-
leagues are no more competent to rule on the issue than "nine people picked at random 
from the Kansas City telephone directory." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
53 This is not to deny that there is a connection between Scalia's theory about the 
Coun's role in abortion and in terminating care, as he has consistently stated that the 
Coun should remove itself from the abortion issue by overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). 
54 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289. 
55 One could argue that courts have interpreted the criminal law to make its use diffi-
cult in ethically complex situations. In Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. 
App. 1983), the California coun established a very difficult standard for even indicting 
physicians for murder when there was some evidence that the doctors may have ended life 
support too soon. The Coun reasoned that the action of removing life suppon was an 
"omission," and therefore, there was no violation of the physician's duty to the patient as a 
matter of law. Id. at 493. See PALMER, supra note 13, at 100-05. 
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of families, an area in which fundamental societal choices are made. 
The Court's conflicting abortion opinions are better read as conflict-
ing views of the Court's institutional role in making public policy on 
family formation rather than merely as decisions reflecting individual 
Justices' "political decisions" or views on the propriety and morality of 
abortion. 
Justice O'Connor's recent opinion in Casey v. Planned 
Parenthood,56 for instance, rejected a legislative requirement that a 
woman notify her husband prior to an abortionP The Court, how-
ever, upheld the legislative provisions requiring a twenty-four hour 
waiting period,58 as well as provisions requiring physicians to give the 
woman information about fetal development as part of the consent 
process.59 In so doing, Justice O'Connor centered her analysis of 
abortion not on medicine as an institution, but rather on the degree 
to which the political process could restrict the decision-making au-
thority of individual women. As to the Pennsylvania legislature's re-
quirement that the physician provide information about the fetus to a 
woman, she stated: 
Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may 
have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the 
woman's position. The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or 
override the two more general rights under which the abortion 
right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to 
physical autonomy. On its own, the doctor-patient relation here is 
entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a 
requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part 
of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional pur-
poses, no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain 
specific information about any medical procedure.60 
Justice O'Connor's views on the political process in regard to 
abortion are better illustrated by her concurrence in Webster v. Repr<r 
ductive Health Services,61 where she joined the Court's decision uphold-
ing a state statute declaring that fetal life begins at conception. As an 
institutional actor, Justice O'Connor is subject to many influences 
when she attempts to resolve a legal dispute, but the most important 
are her institutional choices reflected in her own opinions. It is a mis-
56 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
57 Id. at 2830. 
58 Id. at 2823. 
59 Id. at 2791. 
60 Id. at 2824. O'Connor's opinion makes it clear that the provision for spousal notifi-
cation is unconstitutional because it was not a regulation of the obligation between a 
woman and her husband regarding children, but rather of the decision to terminate her 
pregnancy. Id. at 2829-30. 
61 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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take, in my view, to assume, as Dworkin does, that how Justice 
O'Connor decides cases is determined solely by her values or her 
search for an overarching definition of"liberty."62 How she decides a 
constitutional question involving physician-assisted suicide may be 
framed by her views of the Court's role in the difficult public policy 
issue of abortion. 63 
Dworkin's views on physician-assisted suicide are driven by his 
views on abortion. To make the link between his analysis and doc-
trines within constitutional theory, he concludes that there is a "right 
of procreative autonomy'' which is grounded in the First Amend-
ment's prohibition against the establishment of religion and guaran-
tee of the free exercise of religion.64 For Dworkin, the t:inting of our 
individual deaths is a question of the ultimate meaning or sacredness 
of life in some religious sense. He endorses the theory of Justice Ste-
vens that statutes restricting abortion violate the First Amendment. 65 
Thus, the doctrines developed in abortion cases should influence the 
doctrines developed for physician-assisted suicide. 
Dworkin does not, however, acknowledge that shifting the doctri-
nal basis for the right to an abortion or the "right to die" from "lib-
erty" or "privacy'' to the First Amendment would require another 
more complex type of institutional analysis: the state's relation to reli-
gion as an institution. 56 This area is murky because the Court and its 
scholarly critics have not fully recognized school prayer, financial sup-
port for religious schools, or moments of silence as attempts to find 
the appropriate institutional balance between the state and religion. 67 
62 DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 126. 
63 Predicting how she would decide a constitutional case involving physician-assisted 
suicide is risky without attention to more of her opinions in related cases. Dworkin is 
critical of the twenty-four hour waiting period, based on his views of the impact on the 
autonomy of some women. DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 153, 173-74. He does not consider 
that this decision is part of a theory of the legislative/adjudicative interaction that Justice 
O'Connor and her colleagues are attempting to develop having decided not to overrule 
RDe. In my view, the Court, notwithstanding Professor Dworkin's contrary opinion, no 
longer relies upon the theory that the fetus is not a person to justify its opinion. 
64 DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 160. Dworkin also notes that the right of procreative 
autonomy "follows from any competent interpretation of the due process clause .... " Id. 
However, he chooses to focus on the First Amendment arguments. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 160-61. 
67 My own evolving analysis of institutions, admittedly confined to the "law and 
medicine" field has been to suggest that different modes of analysis should be applied to 
public and private institutions. Religion and the family are private institutions, where the 
institutional job for courts is to try to protect those institutions from the majoritarian polit-
ical decisions. I suggest that an appeal to "values" does not increase our capacity to think 
about the hard institutional choices we face in a religiously diverse society in which much 
of the public discourse in scholarship is informed by secularism and the media discourse 
by television evangelism. We should, therefore, acknowledge the power of both kinds of 
participants in the development of the public policy that will eventually affect people's 
lives. 
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In contrast, Dworkin apparently believes that the Court could resolve 
its Establishment Clause controversy by delineating what features 
make a conviction a "religious belief rather than a nonreligious moral 
principle or a personal preference."68 Dworkin, like many modem 
scholars, fails to appreciate that at its core, religion is a matter of prac-
tice and experience, not simply a matter of cognitive belief. 
Unlike Dworkin, I believe the Justices of the Court develop theo-
ries of institutions which assume that aU institutions are imperfect. 
The lack of clarity found in the Court's decisions on the death pen-
alty, for instance, should be seen as hesitant first steps toward estab-
lishing the Court's role vis-a-vis the criminal law process. The Justices 
might have different theories about how discretion ought to be struc-
tured and about the legislative role in that process.69 Not surprisingly, 
in my view, the various Justices might also have different theories 
about the Court's role in shaping public policy toward abortion. 
I address Dworkin in detail here, in part because his analysis of 
the abortion opinions and of the issues of physician-assisted suicide 
have already had enormous influence. A federal district court in the 
State of Washington implicitly accepted Dworkin's reasoning in de-
claring the state's criminal statute prohibiting assisted suicide uncon-
stitutional as applied to physicians of competent terminally ill 
patients.70 A New York physician, Dr. Timothy Quill,71 with the assist-
ance of the Washington-based non-profit group involved in filing the 
Washington lawsuit, has filed suit in federal court seeking to have New 
York's law against assisting suicide declared unconstitutional.72 Dr. 
Jack Kevorkian73 has filed suit in California to force that state to re-
store his license to practice medicine on the ground that its law 
against assisting suicide is unconstitutional.74 To date, no non-profit 
68 DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 161-62. 
69 I must confess that I abandoned an earlier attempt to analyze the Justices' opinions 
over a wide variety of cases as a way of getting us away from the liberal-conservative think-
ing about the Court. See Larry I. Palmer, Two Perspectives on Structuring Discretion: justices 
Stewart and White on the Death Penalty, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 194 (1979). 
70 Compassion in Dying v. State ofWashington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994) 
(relying on similarity between reproductive rights and physician-assisted suicide), rev'd, 49 
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (Mar. 6, 1996). 
71 See TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE. 
(1993); Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALBANY L. RE:v. 
693 (1994). 
72 Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding New York's law against 
assisting suicide). 
73 Although well known in the media as "Dr. Death," Kevorkian considers himself a 
scholar on medical ethics. His early work, Capital Punishment or Capital Gain, 50 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & PouCE. SCI. 50 (1959), involved experimentation on prisoners and pro-
vides the conceptual foundation for his book, PRESCRIPTION ME.DICIDE.: THE. GOODNESS OF 
PLANNED DEATH (1991), in which he presents an argument about ethics. 
74 A motion to dismiss by the State was argued in january 1995, but there has as yet 
been no decision in the case. See Kevarkian Wants State's Suspension Order Lifted, He Also 
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public interest groups have joined with Dr. Kevorkian's assertion of 
freedom. 
For Dworkin and the so-called medical ethicists like Dr. Quill, 
medicine is not a complex institution, but only a forum for discussing 
the physician-patient power dyad in relationship to constitutional 
principles. Dworkin purports to write a book for use in public policy 
resolutions, and expresses surprise in the preface to the paperback 
edition of his book that he did not provide enough guidance for a 
legislative committee in Great Britain considering modification of its 
law regarding terminating care. 75 Perhaps the legislative process can-
not hear Dworkin's voice because he does not speak a variety of insti-
tutional languages. Dworkin assumes that the political process 
malfunctions whenever a fundamental right is implicated or legisla-
tors fail to seriously consider the value of liberty. It does not occur to 
Dworkin that perhaps the manner in which present laws on living wills 
are drafted might actually reflect physician interest. His argument 
reduces itself to the following question: If a woman has a constitu-
tional right to an abortion, does the Constitution provide a patient 
with a terminal illness a constitutional right to physician-assisted sui-
cide?76 Professor Dworkin answers "yes" and suggests that there 
should be a mechanism by which we can end our lives by agreement. 
However, Dworkin's approach is based on a non-institutional analysis 
of medicine and is grounded in his premise that the "good life" must 
be an autonomous life. 
III 
CREATING LIFE: A CAsE OF INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPETENCE 
Yet another series of antitheses to Komesar's book is presented in 
the "rights" view of regulating reproductive technologies. These theo-
rists find an easily identifiable way of regulating reproductive technol-
ogies: resolve the value conflicts. Professor John A. Robertson, who 
builds on Dworkin's work77 in his recently published, Children of 
Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies78 states: 
Challenged California Assisted Suicide Ban, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 9, 1994, at B9 (appealing 
suspension of medical license on state law and constitutional grounds); State Asks Judge to 
Throw Out Kevorkian Lawsuit, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 11, 1995, at B4 (Motion to Dismiss 
argued and taken under consideration). 
75 DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at xiii. 
76 Oregon has become the first state to accept physician-assisted suicide in a statewide 
referendum. Immediately after the statute went into effect, it was challenged as a violation 
of constitutional notions of equal protection. A preliminary injunction against enforce-
ment was issued in Lee v. State, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). 
77 See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 
59 U. CI-n. L. REv. 381 (1992). 
78 ROBERTSON, supra note 1. 
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The goal of this book is to show the importance of procreative 
liberty, the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring, in 
devising the framework for resolving the controversies that repro-
ductive technology creates. It views the issues presented by repro-
ductive technology as first and foremost a question of the scope and 
limits of procreative freedom, and assesses reproductive technolo-
gies in that light. 79 
The organizational structure of his discussion of in vitro fertiliza-
tion illustrates that his overall perspective of value analysis generates 
very different questions from those an institutionalist would ask. After 
presenting his readers with the "facts" of infertility and the technologi-
cal process of in vitro fertilization, Robertson asks a normative ques-
tion: "Should it be done at all?"80 Robertson's answer is negative. 
After describing the biological and moral status of embryos,81 Robert-
son turns to the legal issues and asks: "Do embryos have legal 
rights?"82 Once again, his answer is no. This allows him to deal with 
other issues of control and disposition of embryos, concluding with 
praise for the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in a divorce action 
declaring that an ex-wife had no right to donate frozen embryos over 
the objection of her ex-husband.83 Although Robertson goes on to 
discuss what he calls "consumer protection issues,"84 my focus is on 
demonstrating how different his questions and methods of analyses 
are from an institutional analysis of the legal and public policy ques-
tions surrounding in vitro fertilization. 
An institutionalist would first look at the market process of in vitro 
fertilization. The market might be defined as those individuals who 
choose to have children with the assistance of medical professionals 
through the use of in vitro fertilization. An institutionalist with legal 
training might resist his or her instincts to assume the "facts" of how 
these persons and professionals found each other and deal with insti-
tutional facts that are readily available. 
The institutionalist would hypothesize that individuals who en-
gage in "family formation" activities with the assistance of infertility 
"experts" have managed to work out arrangements that make the so-
79 Id. at 3-4. 
80 Id. at 99. 
81 Id. at 100-03. 
82 Id. at 103. 
83 ld. at 113-14. Robertson's praise is directed at Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602-
03 (Tenn. 1992) where the court suggested that there ought to be an agreement about 
what happens to embryos in case of divorce. Whether the court is correct that there 
should be a pre-implantation agreement about embryo disposition in the event of divorce 
is a highly debatable proposition, not to be dealt with here. See Larry I. Palmer, Who Are the 
Parents of Biotechnological Children'!, 35 JuRIMETRICS J. 17 (1994). 
84 RoBERTSON, supra note 1, at 114 ("questions of safety, efficacy, and access raise ... 
important policy issues"). 
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cial, economic, moral, and legal risks worth taking for them person-
ally-but not, perhaps, for the entire society. An institutionalist would 
consider that using technology to overcome infertility has occurred 
before with the use of artificial insemination.85 There were some legal 
disputes that arose from the use of this technology and eventually 
some legislation in the 1970s. Before deciding if courts or legislatures 
are the primary policy makers, the institutionalist would ask a more 
general initial question: From the perspective of law, are artificial in-
semination and in vitro fertilization similar processes?86 
In institutional analysis, following Komesar's lead, we ask the pol-
icy questions from the perspective of the institution that is the least 
hannful alternative for answering the question. My question, for in-
stance, assumes that people are using in vitro fertilization. The ques-
tion further assumes that without Professor Robertson's erudite 
analysis, some of the participants in the assisted-reproduction process 
are aware of differing ethical views of the appropriateness of using in 
vitro fertilization. Most important, the question assumes that a com-
plete legal prohibition of the use of in vitro fertilization in our com-
plex society is simply not possible. 
In my view, both courts and the political process are relatively 
incompetent at preventing wealthy individuals with sufficient interest 
in gaining access to physicians and reproductive technologies from 
doing so.87 This would argue for a minimalist role for both courts and 
legislatures as compared to what I rather loosely will call "market 
forces."88 
85 Robertson mentions artificial insemination in his introduction, but does not draw 
any institutional lessons from this experience. Interestingly, he does mention that "due to 
discriminatory access to the medicalized system of sperm procurement, an unknown 
amount of AI occurs outside doctors offices with privately procured sperm and self-admin-
istration via turkey basters and syringes." RoBERTSON, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Daniel]. 
Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey Easter Babies: The Demedicializaiton of Artificial Insemina-
tion, 69 MILBANK Q. 5 (1991)). 
86 See Palmer, supra note 83. 
87 Robertson indicates in his preface that his attention was drawn to the subject of in 
vitro fertilization in 1984, when he saw a newspaper headline that read: "Test Tube Or-
phans: Frozen Embryos Might Inherit $8 Million Fonune." "The story was about a wealthy 
American couple who had died in a plane crash with frozen embryos in storage in Austra-
lia." RoBERTSON, supra note 1, preface ix. 
88 At least one court agrees with my statement: 
We do not underestimate the difficolties of legislating on this subject. In 
addition to the inevitable confrontation with the ethical and moral issues 
involved, there is the question of the wisdom and effectiveness of regulating 
a matter so private, yet of such public interest. Legislative consideration of 
surrogacy may also provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the overall 
implications of the new reproductive biotechnology-in vitro fertilization, 
preservation of sperms and eggs, embryo implantation and the like. The 
problem is how to el'lioy the benefits of the technology-especially for in-
fertile couples-while minimizing the risk of abuse. The problem can be 
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The analytical process involved in drafting legislation to deal with 
in vitro fertilization, for instance, would have to take seriously the 
claims of special interest groups, such as those with religious objec-
tions to the use of new reproductive technologies. These deeply felt 
values cannot be supplanted by an appeal to the values held by a heu-
ristic reasonable woman or man, as suggested by Professor Dworkin's 
approach to physician-assisted suicide. In this process, court cases are 
institutional lessons rather than clear directives about whose "rights" 
are superior. 
Believers in "procreative liberty," like Professor Robertson, are 
uneasy with an institutional unwillingness to define rights, since for 
Robertson defining rights answers the public policy questions. Thus, 
Robertson believes it is unconstitutional for a court to refuse to en-
force an agreement to relinquish all claims to parental status pursuant 
to a surrogate parent agreement.89 The institutionalist might look at 
some practices, such as "gestational surrogacy," and generate ques-
tions for legislatures rather than for courts. An institutionalist uses 
answers to previous institutional questions when analyzing new situa-
tions such as the practice of couples attempting to hire another 
woman to carry their embryo to term. If the legislature were to make 
the institutional decision to treat artificial insemination and in vitro 
fertilization in a similar fashion, the practice of gestational surrogacy 
generates a new question. 
"Is gestation legally significant?" This institutional question arises 
because separating gestation from fertilization for women is now 
clearly possible. If the legislature were to answer the question in the 
affirmative and also decide that the genetic contribution of a woman 
arguably made her a parent, the possibility of two mothers would arise 
in the eyes of the law. 90 A legislature attempting to resolve whether 
genetic mothers or gestational mothers should be the mother for 
legal purposes might not come up with a definitive answer. 
The New York legislature recently passed the Surrogate Parenting 
Contract Act which established a "public policy" and an institutional 
mechanism for carrying out that policy. The second section of the law 
declares surrogate parenting contracts, as later defined, void and un-
addressed only when society decides what its values and objectives are in 
this troubling, yet promising, area 
In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A2d 1227, 1264 (1988). 
89 He states: "The procreative liberty of both infertile couples and surrogates would 
be advanced by upholding preconception agreements for surrogate services. If the parties 
have a constitutional right to use non-coital means of forming families, that right should 
include enforcement of preconception surrogate contracts." RoBERTSON, supra note 1, at 
131. 
90 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) .. Elsewhere, I have suggested 
that the Calvert opinion is an insufficient analysis of the alternatives the legislature is actu-
ally faced with by the use of this technology. See Palmer, supra note 83, at 24-26. 
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enforceable because they are "against public policy."91 When it came 
to delineating how courts should resolve disputes, the legislature was 
less than definitive. It only told courts not to "consider the birth 
mother's participating in the surrogate parenting contract as adverse 
to her parental rights, status, or obligations."92 As to the genetic 
mother, the statute is silent as to her possible claims, although she is 
recognized as a potential disputant.93 This possible compromise in 
the political process does not demonstrate the incompetence of the 
legislature, but perhaps its sensitivity to the depth of claims before it.94 
As a declaration of public policy, the New York Surrogate Parenting 
Contract Act is only a structure for decision-making by lawyers, physi-
cians, and private persons.95 
The refusal to deal with Robertson's normative question of con-
sidering a total ban on the use of in vitro fertilization highlights the 
difference between an institutionalist's and a rights analyst's approach 
to public policy issues of new reproductive technology. The institu-
tion of the family in all of its forms-single teenage mothers, married 
couples with their biological children, single men or women with their 
adopted or biological children, couples with children born with the 
assistance of reproductive technologies-is an important aspect of 
maintaining democratic values over the longhaul. As such, the most 
important function of law, in relationship to the family as a private 
institution, is to protect it from the state.96 This simply means that 
both courts and legislatures should carefully analyze their institutional 
incompetence in the face of basic human desires before enacting stat-
utes or deciding cases. In particular, the answer from either courts or 
91 N.Y. DoM. REI.. LAw § 122 (Consol. Supp. 1994). 
92 Id. § 124(1). 
93 Id. § 124. 
94 As I stated in another connection: 
All claims-of those who contribute genetic materials (men and wo-
men) to creating children as well as of those who provide gestational 
birth-are equally powerful and entitled to respect in the legislative pro-
cess. Put more bluntly, when it comes to deeply intimate matters such as 
the meaning of our lives and our connection to the future through those 
we call 'children,' I believe the legislature can provide only a structure, and 
perhaps some incentives or disincentives .... 
Larry I. Palmer, A Rejoinder, 35 juRIMETRicsj. 51, 53 (1994). 
95 It is worth noting that the only persons subject to a criminal penalty under the Nav 
York Statute are those who take fees for their services in connection with surrogate ar-
rangements more than once. Brokers who are found to have violated the specific prohibi-
tions of offering brokerage services for a fee are guilty of a felony if previously convicted of 
violating the prohibitions. N.Y. DoM. REI.. LAw§ 123(2) (b) (Consol. Supp. 1994). On the 
other hand, the private parties-including the birth mother and genetic mother-are only 
subject to a civil penalty of up to $500 for violating the statute. Id. § 123(2) (a). 
96 Komesar agrees with the broad proposition that law in the form of legislation or 
judicial pronouncements is used to protect people from the will of the majority. KOMESAR, 
supra note 3, at 227-31. 
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legislatures, after careful analysis of market behavior, might be "I 
don't know." This institutional analysis ironically leads to the result 
that the legislative process contributes to the public policy process by 
clarifying the nature of our uncertainty. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing institutional analyses were prompted by a commit-
ted reading of Komesar's book. His thesis makes us more aware of the 
possibility that what passes for social analysis of a problem, particularly 
when the issue is something like "protecting the value of autonomy," 
is based on the premise that some institutional process is faulty. 
Komesar instructs us, as scholars looking at social issues, to be careful 
to define them in terms of institutions, for example, family formation, 
rather than in terms of a particular social goal, such as procreative 
liberty. He further urges us to consider law as an institutional process 
with limitations, so that we can refine and sharpen its use for the ulti-
mate social good. From the perspective of comparative institutional 
analysis, Komesar cautions us that even for problems as complex as 
how children should be born and how and when individuals should 
die, "we need to assess the efficacy of alternative strategies for protec-
tion against minoritarian or majoritarian bias. "97 
Let me suggest that Komesar's analysis should make us question 
not only the implicit choice of courts as an institution in Professor 
Robertson's analysis, but perhaps also lead us towards the question of 
whether any legal regulation is desirable. I maintain that Komesar's 
approach makes it possible to seriously consider doing nothing, or at 
least doing very little. Issues of how children should be "formed" and 
when life should end include issues about individual spiritual mean-
ing, issues often ignored in most forms of modern legal scholarship. 
My analysis of Komesar's book suggests that legal scholars should 
take existing institutions seriously, not for the purpose of maintaining 
the same institutional structures, but for the purpose of providing 
analyses of those institutional arrangements that will help policy mak-
ers resolve dilemmas in a marginally better way. My criticism of Dwor-
kin's and Robertson's approaches to public policy demonstrates how 
much legal scholarship focuses on courts, while ignoring other institu-
tional alternatives. 
If we consider our comparative advantages, legal scholarship has 
a considerable contribution to make to the larger knowledge enter-
prise that is under both internal and external examination. If we look 
at what we do in providing professional training for future practition-
ers, government officials, judges, legislators, and even business manag-
97 KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 226-27. 
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ers, we have the opportunity of being scholars who live within the 
intricacies and uncertainties of the practical and the theoretical. Not 
only in our teaching do we need to make the conflicts between the 
two more visible, but also in our scholarship. We must deal more ex-
plicitly with the questions institutional participants, such as Supreme 
Court Justices, ask and the questions we ask ourselves. 
Komesar makes one weary of the economists' self-serving per-
son,9s the public values of Dworkin's rational person,99 and Robert-
son's bioethical person as primary modes of analysis of any public 
policy problem.10° Komesar's scholarship does not treat the motiva-
tion of individual actors as determinative. He focuses on the complex-
ities of human institutions. 
Until we start a meaningful dialogue among ourselves about how 
our teaching, scholarship, and public service fit into some type of 
whole, our thinking will be lacking in systematic approaches to the 
complex institutional concerns faced by our society. The legal scholar 
purporting to deal with a public policy issue must confront the fact 
that law is a complex institution interacting with other equally com-
plex institutional arrangements in society. 
By engaging us in comparative institutional analysis, Komesar 
forces us to deal with the dynamic complexity of institutions in mass 
societies. He does a masterful job of comparing the market, the polit-
ical process, and the adjudicative process within the framework of par-
ticular problems. I have analyzed the institutions of medicine and 
family. I suggest that we need to pay more attention to analysis of the 
legislative process in legal scholarship and teaching. When I criticize 
the manner in which Professor Dworkin fails to deal with the doctrinal 
analysis of "liberty'' in the various opinions in Cruzan,101 I am sug-
gesting that we must deal with the detailed analysis of particular insti-
tutions, such as our United States Supreme Court, before presenting 
policy makers with guidance for complex policy processes. 
Such a careful, detailed analysis by legal scholars is important be-
cause those we teach are in the process of developing their own 
frames of reference for professional practice. When our students be-
come law clerks, judges, partners in law firms, and mothers and fa-
thers asking school officials about their children's education, they will 
be speaking from a frame of reference about the world that we can 
marginally influence by the ways in which we teach and practice our 
craft of scholarship. 
98 See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text. 
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Neil Komesar is both a good scholar and a good writer, and his 
message is clear: think hard about the institutional arrangements al-
ready in place by analyzing those institutions. Articulate the social 
goals, and distinguish them from public policy issues which are, in 
Komesar's view, institutional choices. If we engage in the careful anal-
ysis Komesar suggests, we will be privileged to be participants in the 
process of trying to be of service to the larger global society by careful 
analysis of its many complex and fragile institutions. Remember that 
the quality of our individual lives depends upon the humaneness of 
the institutional arrangements in which we live.102 This is, in essence, 
the real purpose of legal scholarship. 
102 Komesar describes the complexities of modern life in the opening paragraph of his 
book. KoMESAR, supra note 3, at 3. See also Larry I. Palmer, Good People, Bad Institutions 
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
